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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
ARMED AND LITIGIOUS: THE FLORIDA GUNS AT  
WORK LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY  
MATTHEW BEVILLE*
 This Note addresses the Northern District of Florida’s recent deci-
sion evaluating the constitutionality of Florida’s controversial “guns 
at work” law.1 In Florida Retail Federation, Inc. v. Attorney General,2
the court held that the provisions of the statute requiring businesses 
to allow customers to keep firearms in their cars were unconstitu-
tional under the Equal Protection Clause, but upheld the constitu-
tionality of the statute as applied to employees.3 Florida Retail is 
notable for three reasons. First, the case involves a unique intersec-
tion of property rights, legislative prerogatives, and statutory inter-
pretation. Second, the court decided the case on rational basis equal 
protection grounds, which is noteworthy on its own, but particularly 
interesting because the court appears to have raised the equal pro-
tection argument sua sponte. Finally, there is some tension between 
the court’s determination that the statute is not ambiguous and its 
holding that the customer rights provision violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. This Note provides a short summary of the statute be-
fore addressing Chief Judge Hinkle’s opinions in the case.  
 Section 790.251, Florida Statutes (2008), was adopted to guaran-
tee citizens’ “right[s] to possess and keep legally owned firearms 
within their motor vehicles for self-defense and other lawful purpos-
es, and that these rights are not abrogated by virtue of a citizen be-
coming a customer, employee, or invitee of a business entity.”4 Under 
the statute, any employee5 has the right to bring a firearm to work, 
provided it is locked in a vehicle in the parking lot.6 However, by sta-
                                                                                                                    
 *. J.D., Florida State University College of Law; B.A., Florida State University. Spe-
cial thanks to my wife, Holly Beville. The author is available for comment by email at 
mlbeville@gmail.com. 
 1. See FLA. STAT. § 790.251 (2008); see also Dara Kam, ‘Guns at Work’ Bill Becomes 
Law, PALM BCH. POST, Apr. 16, 2008, available at http://www.palmbeachpost.com/ 
state/content/state/epaper/2008/04/16/a14a_xgr_guns_0416.html. 
 2. 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (N.D. Fla.), modified, 576 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (N.D. Fla. 2008) 
(merging merits into preliminary injunction order and granting permanent injunction 
against enforcing customer rights provision). 
 3. Id. The Northern District of Oklahoma reached the opposite result and invali-
dated a similar statute that was preempted by the Occupational Health and Safety Act 
(OSHA). See ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1295-96 (N.D. Okla. 2007); 
see also OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2000). However, as discussed below, Judge Hinkle persua-
sively argues that OSHA does not preempt most state regulation of workplace safety. See
Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1298-99.  
 4. FLA. STAT. § 790.251(3) (2008) (providing legislative intent). 
 5. For statutory purposes, “[e]mployee” includes independent contractors and volun-
teers. Id. § 790.251(2)(c). 
 6. Id.
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tutory definition, “employee” only includes workers with concealed-
carry permits.7 An “employer,” inartfully defined as a business with 
“employees,” may not take action against employees who legally 
bring firearms to work nor condition employment on whether an ap-
plicant has a concealed-carry permit.8 Similarly, the law prohibits 
employers from discriminating against applicants with concealed-
carry permits when making hiring decisions.9 The statute extends a 
similar right to customers, regardless of whether they possess a con-
cealed-carry permit.10 However, because the statutory definitions are 
particularly inelegant, a plain reading of the text extends this right 
only to businesses that have statutory “employees”—that is, only 
businesses with at least one employee with a concealed-carry per-
mit.11 The statute provides for a $10,000 fine for each violation,12 but 
it exempts certain classes of employers, such as schools and correc-
tional facilities.13
 The Florida Retail Federation and the Florida Chamber of Com-
merce immediately challenged the validity of section 790.251 in the 
Northern District, requesting the court to declare the statute uncons-
titutional and enjoin its enforcement.14 The plaintiffs argued that 
section 790.251 violated the Due Process Clause,15 constituted a regu-
latory taking without due process or just compensation,16 and vi-
olated the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA).17 The plain-
tiffs then moved for a preliminary injunction.18 The National Rifle 
                                                                                                                    
 7. See id. § 790.06. 
 8. Id. § 790.251.  
 9. Id. § 790.251(4)(c). 
 10. Id. Customers with concealed-carry permits have the right to carry a concealed 
weapon into businesses held open to the public, unless otherwise posted. See id. § 
790.06(12) (explaining that concealed-carry permittees are only restricted from taking fire-
arms into places of nuisance, police stations, courtrooms, polling places, government build-
ings, schools, colleges, bars, and airports). Similarly, it is not illegal to possess a firearm in 
a vehicle, so long as it “is securely encased or is otherwise not readily accessible for imme-
diate use.” Id. § 790.25(5); see also § 790.001(17) (“ ‘Securely encased’ means in a glove 
compartment, whether or not locked; snapped in a holster; in a gun case, whether or not 
locked; in a zippered gun case; or in a closed box or container which requires a lid or cover 
to be opened for access.”); Ashley v. State, 619 So. 2d 294, 296 (Fla. 1993) (holding that 
firearm was not readily accessible when kept on floor of car without ammunition in ve-
hicle); State v. Weyant, 990 So. 2d 675, 678 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (holding that handgun was 
not readily accessible when kept wedged between seats and loaded magazine was kept in 
center console). Thus, the statute only applies to those businesses that have explicitly pro-
hibited firearms on their premises. 
 11. See FLA. STAT. § 790.251.  
 12. Id. §§ 760.51, 790.251. 
 13. Id. § 790.251(7). 
 14. Complaint at 7-10, Fla. Retail Fed. v. Attorney Gen., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (N.D. 
Fla.), modified, 576 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (N.D. Fla. 2008) (No. 1).  
 15. Id. at 7-8. 
 16. Id. at 8. 
 17. Id. at 9-10. 
 18. Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1284. 
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Association moved to intervene as a defendant,19 and the Brady Cen-
ter to Prevent Gun Violence and several human resource interest 
groups filed amicus curiae briefs in support of the plaintiffs.20 The 
court held a hearing on the preliminary injunction, which was later 
consolidated with the merits in the court’s final judgment.21
 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ takings claim outright.22 Section 
790.251 is clearly not a categorical taking. It is not a permanent tak-
ing, as the state did not appropriate or physically occupy the land,23
nor does it regulate the property so completely as to totally deprive 
employers of the economic value of their property.24 Outside these 
                                                                                                                    
 19. National Rifle Association’s Unopposed Motion to Intervene as a Defendant, Fla. 
Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (No. 5); see also Order Granting Leave to Intervene - Na-
tional Rifle Association, Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (No. 17). 
 20. Amicus Curiae Brief by the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, Fla. Retail 
Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (No. 16); Society for Human Resource Management’s (“SHRM”), 
HR Florida State Council’s (“HR Florida”), Human Resource Ass’n of Broward County’s 
(“HRABC”), Human Resource Management Ass’n of Palm Beach County’s (“HRPBC”), and 
HR Tampa’s Brief as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunc-
tion, Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (No. 24-2). 
 21. Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1302-03; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a)(2) (“Be-
fore or after beginning the hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the court may 
advance the trial on the merits and consolidate it with the hearing.”). 
 22. Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1289-90. The Fifth Amendment prohibits the 
government from taking private property for public use without just compensation. U.S.
CONST. amend. V. While the Takings Clause nominally applies only to government sei-
zures of private property, the Supreme Court has “recognized that government regulation 
of private property may, in some instances, be so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a 
direct appropriation or ouster—and that such ‘regulatory takings’ may be compensable un-
der the Fifth Amendment.” Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005). 
 As a threshold matter, the Northern District could have dismissed the takings claim 
as premature. See Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of John-
son City, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985) (“The Fifth Amendment does not [prohibit state appro-
priation] of property, it proscribes taking without just compensation.”). Thus, the remedy 
for a regulatory taking is not an injunction, but compensation. Because determining the 
proper remedy requires analyzing property values and investment-backed expectations, a 
takings claim is premature until a property owner has applied for compensation and been 
denied. Id. at 195, 199-200. However, given the weakness of the takings claim, it was 
pragmatically justified to dismiss it without the need for costly compensation proceedings. 
 23. Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1288-89; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982) (holding narrowly that permanent phys-
ical occupation of property constitutes a taking). 
 24. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-15 (1992). Many commen-
tators believe Lucas is fairly limited to its facts; some believe its result is due to an errone-
ous finding of fact at the trial level. See, e.g., Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Non-Impact of the 
United States Supreme Court Regulatory Takings Cases on the State Courts: Does the Su-
preme Court Really Matter?, 6 FORDHAM ENVT’L L.J. 523, 548 (1995) (“The end result of 
this review indicates that the Lucas decision has not had a major impact on the state 
courts and has not resulted in more than a trivial number of constitutional invalidations of 
state and local regulations.”); Jeffrey A. Wilcox, Note, Taking Cover: Fifth Amendment 
Takings Jurisprudence as a Tool for Resolving Water Disputes in the American West, 55 
HASTINGS L.J. 477, 490 (2003) (“The Lucas opinion, though important to an understanding 
of recent takings jurisprudence, is of limited relevance beyond its peculiar facts. Specifical-
ly, the lower court’s finding that the property was completely valueless after the regulation 
seems a bit hard to swallow.”). 
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narrow confines, a taking will be found only if the “ ‘regulation has 
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.’ ”25 While 
employers are required to permit employees to keep firearms in their 
vehicles, the statute does not otherwise require property owners to 
make their property available to people or purposes against their 
will.26 Despite the Florida Retail Federation’s reliance on Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission27 and Dolan v. City of Tigard,28 the 
court correctly found that they were inapplicable here.29 Unlike Nol-
lan and Dolan, the statute does not require the dedication of a per-
manent easement or comparable invasion of a property owner’s right 
to exclude.30 Though implicit, the court appeared to hold that the sta-
tute simply did not go far enough to constitute a taking.31
 The court similarly dismissed the substantive due process and 
OSHA claims.32 Apart from fundamental rights,33 “courts give sub-
                                                                                                                    
 25. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). 
 26. Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1289. The court’s conclusion should not be ter-
ribly surprising. Though he did not do so expressly, Judge Hinkle appeared to apply the 
Penn Central balancing test. See Stewart E. Sterk, The Demise of Federal Takings Litiga-
tion, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 251, 287 (2006) (“[W]hen the Court decides the Penn Central
test is applicable to a state or local regulation, the landowner always loses.”). 
 27. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 28. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
 29. Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1289-90.  
 30. See Dolan, 512 U.S. 374; Nollan, 483 U.S. 825. Nollan and Dolan deal primarily 
with exactions and not outright takings; however, Nollan found that a permanent ease-
ment was a physical occupation and thus a per se taking. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 832 (“We 
think a ‘permanent physical occupation’ has occurred, for purposes of that rule, where in-
dividuals are given a permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real 
property may continuously be traversed, even though no particular individual is permitted 
to station himself permanently upon the premises.”). The plaintiffs relied heavily on this 
point to argue that their duty to permit firearms on their property was similarly invasive, 
which explains why Judge Hinkle was careful to distinguish these cases, even though he 
had already concluded that section 790.251 did not constitute a permanent occupation. See
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Request for Expedited Hearing, and Memorandum of 
Law at 5-6, Fla. Retail Fed., 756 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (No. 9). 
 31. Cf. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“The general rule at least 
is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will 
be recognized as a taking.”).  
 32. Fla. Retail Fed., 756 F. Supp. 2d at 1297-99. The court rejected the plaintiff’s di-
rect substantive due process claims; however it raised the possibility that the Due Process 
Clause also prevents legislatures treating “like-situated individuals or businesses diffe-
rently without an adequate basis.” Id. at 1288. While this protection is traditionally the 
province of the Equal Protection Clause, it could conceivably arise from the Due Process 
Clause’s protection against “wholly irrational restrictions.” Id. at 1287. For a more detailed 
analysis of this distinction, see infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text. 
 33. Though the U.S. Supreme Court has not fully defined the scope of fundamental 
rights, it has found these rights include at least  
the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the “liberty” specially pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause includes the rights to marry, to have children, 
to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children, to marital privacy, to 
use contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion. We have also assumed, 
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stantial deference to legislative judgments” and apply rational basis 
scrutiny to regulations challenged under the substantive component 
of the Due Process Clause.34 Under a rational basis analysis, “the 
challenged provision need only be rationally related to a legitimate 
government purpose.”35 Though it seems doubtful that permitting 
employees and customers to keep firearms in their vehicles would 
have any substantive effect on crime,36 the Northern District held 
that the legislature could have reasonably determined that allowing 
employees to keep firearms in their vehicles would serve a legitimate 
state interest.37 Similarly, the “decision to protect only a worker with 
a concealed-carry permit” was clearly not an irrational distinction.38
 The plaintiffs also argued that OSHA preempted section 
790.251.39 Under OSHA, employers have a general duty to provide a 
workplace free “ ‘from recognized hazards that are causing or are 
likely to cause death or serious physical harm’ ” and to “ ‘comply with 
occupational safety and health standards promulgated’ ” by the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Administration.40 The plaintiffs, rely-
                                                                                                                    
and strongly suggested, that the Due Process Clause protects the traditional 
right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment. 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20 (1997) (citations omitted). 
 34. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005) (“[W]e have long 
eschewed such heightened scrutiny when addressing substantive due process challenges to 
government regulation.”); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 124-25 
(1978) (“Regardless of the ultimate economic efficacy of the statute, we have no hesitancy 
in concluding that it bears a reasonable relation to the State’s legitimate purpose . . . , and 
we therefore reject appellants’ due process claim.”); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-
32 (1963) (“We refuse to sit as a ‘superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation . . . .’ ” 
(quoting Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952))).  
 35. Schwarz v. Kogan, 132 F.3d 1387, 1391 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 36. Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1290 (“The statute will rarely make any dif-
ference at all but may sometimes cause a result that is positive, sometimes negative.”). The 
plaintiffs argued that because firearms are required to be locked in the trunk, the statute 
could not rationally relate to the State’s interest in promoting lawful self-defense. Motion 
for Preliminary Injunction, Request for Expedited Hearing, and Memorandum of Law, su-
pra note 30, at 13-14. The court disagreed, noting that occasionally situations requiring 
self-defense “develop over enough time” to allow the firearm to be retrieved from the ve-
hicle. Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1290-91. “More importantly,” an employee would 
be able to have access to the firearm “while en route to and from his or her job.” Id. at 
1291. While unlikely to substantially deter or prevent crime, the possibility was not so re-
mote as to overcome the deference afforded the legislature by the rational basis test. 
 37. Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1290-91. 
 38. Id. at 1289 (“The permit process provides some check on the person’s qualification 
to have a weapon in particular circumstances.”). 
 39. Id. at 1297-98. 
 40. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (2006)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 655 (2006) (providing 
for promulgation of “national consensus standards”). The OSHA claim was probably the 
plaintiffs’ best argument. Most of the amici focused solely on this claim and ConocoPhillips
actually addressed a narrower statute. 
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ing on ConocoPhillips,41 argued that the general duty clause 
preempted section 790.251.42 Judge Hinkle, however, declined to 
adopt the Northern District of Oklahoma’s reasoning and found that 
the general duty clause did not preempt section 790.251.43 Contrary 
to the holding of the district court in ConocoPhillips, OSHA disclaims 
any intent to preempt state laws that are not contrary to published 
standards.44 Accordingly, because the Agency has not promulgated a 
national standard for firearms in the workplace, the state may freely 
adopt whatever regulations it deems necessary.45 The general duty 
clause mandates businesses to provide a workplace free of recognized 
hazards; if firearms in the workplace were a recognized hazard, then 
employers would be required to prohibit them.46 As businesses clearly 
do not have a duty to ban firearms, the general duty clause does not 
preempt section 790.251.47
 Interestingly, Judge Hinkle raised, apparently sua sponte, an 
equal protection argument against the customer rights provision of 
section 790.251.48 While the court indicated that both the Equal Pro-
tection and Due Process Clauses prohibit a state from “treat[ing] 
like-situated individuals or businesses differently without an ade-
quate basis,”49 it appears that neither the plaintiffs nor their amici 
raised an equal protection argument.50 Further, while the Equal Pro-
tection and Due Process Clauses share similar standards of review, 
                                                                                                                    
 41. ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1340 (N.D. Okla. 2007), rev’d,
Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2009) (invalidating similar guns-at-
work law for violating OSHA general duty clause). 
 42. Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1297. 
 43. Id. at 1298-99. 
 44. Id. at 1298 (“When Congress elects not to preempt a state law, the law is not 
preempted.”); see also 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (2006) (“Nothing in this chapter shall prevent any 
State agency or court from asserting jurisdiction under State law over any occupational 
safety or health issue with respect to which no standard is in effect under section 655 of 
this title.”). Interestingly, ConocoPhillips was reversed on appeal by the Tenth Circuit, 
which cited Judge Hinkle’s opinion approvingly. See Ramsey Winch Inc., 555 F.3d at 1207.  
 45. Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1298. 
 46. Id. at 1298-99. 
 47. Id.
 48. The employee rights provision did not raise equal protection concerns. While the 
provision only applies to employers with at least one employee with a concealed-carry per-
mit, all businesses are treated alike. Id. at 1289 (“Every business must allow any worker 
with a concealed-carry permit to have a gun in the worker’s vehicle.”). 
 49. Id. at 1288. 
 50. See Complaint, supra note 14; Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Request for Ex-
pedited Hearing, and Memorandum of Law, supra note 30; Amicus Curiae Brief by the 
Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, supra note 20; Society for Human Resource Man-
agement’s (SHRM), HR Florida State Council’s (HR Florida), Human Resource Ass’n of 
Broward County’s (HRABC), Human Resource Management Ass’n of Palm Beach County’s 
(HRPBC), and HR Tampa’s Brief as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Pre-
liminary Injunction, supra note 20. The plaintiffs did introduce evidence that customers 
may prefer to frequent businesses that do not allow concealed weapons on their premises; 
however this was not used to support an explicit equal protection argument. See Fla. Retail 
Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1292. 
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courts do not routinely permit equal protection arguments to support 
due process causes of action.51 Under the Equal Protection Clause, “a 
statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor 
infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against 
equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable set 
of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”52
Because concealed-carry permittees and their employers are not sus-
pect classes and the right to carry a gun at work is not a fundamen-
tal right, the court found that section 790.251 was subject to the low-
est level of constitutional scrutiny.53
 The court noted that only statutory “employers” would be required 
to allow their customers to keep firearms in their cars; thus, a cus-
tomer would only have the right to leave a firearm in his or her car in 
the parking lot if the business where he or she was shopping had an 
employee with a concealed-carry permit.54 Therefore, businesses next 
door to one another could be treated differently under statute. Fur-
ther, as personnel changes, and concealed-carry permits are issued, 
expire, or are revoked, it would be nearly impossible for businesses to 
know whether they were subject to the statute on a day-to-day ba-
sis.55 This uncertainty appears to be the guiding factor in the court’s 
decision. Because of the difficulty of differentiating between busi-
                                                                                                                    
 51. Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1288 (quoting Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 
947-48 (11th Cir. 2001)). In Williams, the Eleventh Circuit stated that “[s]tatutes that in-
fringe fundamental rights, or that make distinctions based upon suspect classifications 
such as race or national origin, are subject to strict scrutiny, which requires that the sta-
tute be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.” Williams, 240 F.3d 
at 947. This quote is somewhat ambiguous; however, in context it is clear the Eleventh 
Circuit is not conflating the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, but discussing the 
importance of correctly deciding the level of scrutiny to apply to a particular statute. While 
rational basis inquiry is similar under the two provisions, the Williams court did not imply 
that equal protection claims could be raised as a subset of claims permissible under the 
Due Process Clause. See id. Though the Due Process Clause does protect against purely ir-
rational restraints, which conceivably includes irrational distinctions, courts tend to re-
strict the due process analysis to the nature of the restraint, while analyzing the impact of 
the restraint across populations under the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, despite the Wil-
liams passage, it appears the Northern District’s equal protection rulings were outside the 
scope of the plaintiff’s express claims.  
 52. F.C.C. v. Beach Comms., Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993); see also Georgia Cemetery 
Ass’n v. Cox, 353 F.3d 1319, 1321 (11th Cir. 2003). This standard is quite forgiving; “a leg-
islature that creates these categories need not ‘actually articulate at any time the purpose 
or rationale supporting its classification.’ ” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (quoting 
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992)).  
 53. Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1288.  
 54. Id. at 1291-93. 
 55. Id. This difficulty is compounded because independent contractors are considered 
employees under section 790.251; thus a business’s duty to allow firearms in its parking lot 
could turn on whether a plumber or electrician had a concealed-carry permit. Id. This un-
certainty is unconstitutional from the employer’s perspective because the employer may be 
unable to determine if it can lawfully exclude firearms. See id. at 1292. On the other hand, 
customers can presume that they are able to keep firearms in their vehicles, unless other-
wise posted. See FLA. STAT. § 790.25(5) (2008). 
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nesses that are subject to the statute and those that are not, the 
court held the customer rights provision unconstitutional even under 
rational basis review.56 The Attorney General argued that the court 
should read the customer rights provision to apply “to all businesses, 
not just to businesses with at least one worker who has a concealed-
carry permit.”57 While the court noted its construction of the statute 
led to an irrational result, it found the statutory language unambi-
guous.58 Because the statutory language was clear, the court refused 
to “rewrite” the statute.59
 The court’s determination that the statute failed the rational ba-
sis test is surprising as nearly “every statute subject to the very defe-
rential rational basis scrutiny standard is found to be constitution-
al.”60 Indeed, a statute may be found constitutional “based on rational 
speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”61 It seems 
clear that the only reason the court found the distinction unconstitu-
tional is that it was entirely inadvertent. A court evaluating the con-
stitutionality of a statute is required “to negative every conceivable 
basis which might support” the customer rights provision;62 under ra-
tional basis, a court will uphold nearly any conscious distinction, 
“ ‘absent some reason to infer antipathy.’ ”63 Here, the problem was 
not that the legislature discriminated against a class of employers, 
but that it failed to articulate a standard that employers could use to 
determine if the statute applied to them.64
 Rather than a reasoned distinction, the statutory history strongly 
implies the distinction was inadvertently created by a poorly drafted 
amendment. As Judge Hinkle noted, an earlier version of the statute 
“would have applied equally to workers who did and did not have 
concealed-carry permits.”65 Though the court declined to determine 
                                                                                                                    
 56. Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1293.  
 57. Id. at 1296. 
 58. Id.
 59. Id.
 60. Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 947-48 (11th Cir. 2001); see also District of Co-
lumbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817 n.27 (2008) (noting that “almost all laws . . . pass 
rational-basis scrutiny”). 
 61. F.C.C. v. Beach Comms., Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993). 
 62. Id. (“[T]he absence of legislative facts explaining the distinction [o]n the record . . . 
has no significance in rational-basis analysis.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)). 
 63. Id. at 314 (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)). 
 64. Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1291-92 (“A business’s obligation to comply 
with the statute thus could turn not only on whether it has a traditional employee with a 
concealed-carry permit, but on whether a person who comes to fix the plumbing has a con-
cealed-carry permit. This could change minute-by-minute. A business often will have no 
way of knowing whether it is subject to the statute or not.”). 
 65. Id. at 1296. The original Senate version of the bill defined “employee” as “any per-
son who [w]orks for salary, wages, or other remuneration; [i]s an independent contractor; 
or [i]s a volunteer, intern, or other similar individual for an employer.” FLA. S. COMM. ON 
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whether the legislature purposefully drafted the customer rights 
provision to garner votes or made a drafting error,66 it seems proba-
ble that the legislature failed to fully incorporate the amended defini-
tion of “employer” into the rest of the statute. The court itself ap-
pears to have overlooked the most convincing evidence that the legis-
lature failed to fully incorporate the amended definition of “employ-
er.” Section 790.251’s antidiscrimination provision only applies to 
statutory employers.67 Thus, a business with no employees with con-
cealed-carry permits at the time the statute was adopted would be 
free to condition employment on whether or not a prospective em-
ployee had a concealed-carry permit and obtain agreements from its 
current employees that they would not acquire concealed-carry  
permits.68 From the text alone, this is inconsistent with the legisla-
ture’s intent. 
 However, the absurdity of the result does not necessarily imply 
that Judge Hinkle’s ruling was incorrect. If “the language of a statute 
is this clear, a court’s job ordinarily is to apply the statute as written, 
not to rewrite it in the belief that the Legislature must have meant 
something else.”69 Further, under normal principles of statutory in-
terpretation, “statutory definitions of terms . . . prevail over colloqui-
al meanings.”70 The court can ignore statutory definitions in rare cas-
es when they would create “obvious incongruities in the language, 
and . . . destroy . . . the major purposes of the [statute].”71 Here, me-
chanically importing the amended definition of “employee” into the 
textual definition of “employer” damages the customer rights and an-
                                                                                                                    
JUDICIARY, CS FOR SB 1130 (draft of March 27, 2008) (providing the proposed FLA. STAT.
§ 790.251). 
 66. Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1296. 
 67. See FLA. STAT. § 790.251(4)(c); see also Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1293-94. 
 68. The statute would become effective if an employee obtained a concealed-carry 
permit in violation of an agreement not to do so; however, the agreement itself would not 
be contrary to the statute until an employee actually obtained a concealed-carry permit 
and brought the employer within the statutory definition. 
 69. Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1296. 
 70. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 502 (1945); see also Stenberg v. Car-
hart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000) (“When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must fol-
low that definition, even if it varies from that term’s ordinary meaning.”); Meese v. Keene, 
481 U.S. 465, 484 (1987) (“It is axiomatic that the statutory definition of the term excludes 
unstated meanings of that term.”). 
 71. Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & Steamship Co., 336 U.S. 198, 201 (1949); see also
Burgess v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1572 (2008) (applying Lawson to refuse to read the de-
finition of “felony” into the definition of “felony drug conviction”); Philko Aviation, Inc. v. 
Shacket, 462 U.S. 406, 412 (1983) (“[W]e need not read the statutory definition mechani-
cally . . . , since to do so would render the recording system ineffective and thus would de-
feat the purpose of the legislation.”). Further, Lawson dealt specifically with an antidi-
scrimination provision under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. 
Lawson, 336 U.S. at 199-200. The Court found that literally importing the statutory defini-
tions would undermine the statute’s antidiscrimination purposes and held that a statutori-
ly defined term was not incorporated to all of the statutory provisions. Id. at 201, 206. 
940 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:931 
tidiscrimination provisions. However, the legislature’s intent is not 
at all clear in this case. While the legislature presumably did not in-
tend to tie the customer rights provision to whether a business had 
employees with concealed-carry permits, it may very well have 
wanted to extend the concealed-carry permit requirement to custom-
ers.72 Without any further guidance, the court correctly invalidated 
the customer rights provision, leaving it to the legislature to correct 
the provision as it sees fit. 
 For all of the attention it received,73 Florida Retail is unlikely to 
have any significant impact on crime or workplace violence. As a pre-
liminary matter, Florida law permits employees and customers alike 
to bring firearms to work unless otherwise posted.74 Further, even 
those firearms kept in a car against the employer’s wishes “will al-
most always stay in the vehicle and affect nobody’s safety one way or 
the other.”75 While it is possible that a firearm kept in a vehicle will 
be used in lawful self-defense or by “an irate worker”76 to commit a 
crime that would not occur if the gun was not readily available, it is 
more likely that all or nearly all guns covered by section 790.251 will 
never be used or needed. Further, violent employees may be unlikely 
to comply with policies prohibiting firearms. Similarly, even if em-
ployers were permitted to prohibit firearms, it is unlikely they could 
enforce the policy on a daily basis or verify its effectiveness. 
 Similarly, while the case raised public policy concerns about the 
benefits and dangers posed by firearms, the decision deals with the 
Second Amendment only peripherally.77 Federal courts have held 
that it is otherwise permissible to fire an employee for bringing a 
                                                                                                                    
 72. See Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1296. 
 73. See, e.g., Catherine Dolinski, Judge Refuses to Stand in Way of Guns-at-Work 
Law, TAMPA TRIB., June 25, 2008, available at http://www2.tbo.com/content/2008/jun/25/ 
judge-refuses-stand-way-guns--work-law; Fla. Guns at Work Law Upheld by Federal 
Judge, MSNBC.COM, July 29, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25918101; Florida 
Chamber Leads Business Challenge to Guns-at-Work Law, TAMPA BAY BUS. J., Apr. 18, 
2008, http://tampabay.bizjournals.com/tampabay/stories/2008/04/21/story5.html; Show-
down, ECONOMIST, July 3, 2008. 
 74. FLA. STAT. § 790.25(5) (2008); see also id. § 790.01(17).  
 75. Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1290. Concealed-carry permittees are very un-
likely to commit violent crimes. The State has only revoked 165 of the over 1.3 million con-
cealed-carry permits issued for firearm related crimes. Defendant, National Rifle Associa-
tion’s, Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
at 11 n.6, Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (No. 31). 
 76. Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1290. 
 77. The court does not cite the Supreme Court’s recent decision in District of Colum-
bia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). Briefing on the motion for preliminary injunction was 
conducted after oral argument was held in Heller, but before the court’s decision. See Re-
sponse of Attorney General in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
at 1 n.1, Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (No. 30). 
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firearm onto an employer’s property.78 Even after Heller, the federal 
right to keep and bear arms does not extend to invitees or employees 
on private property.79 Thus, while Heller’s version of the Second 
Amendment is more robust than the Court has ever previously rec-
ognized, it does not extend to the facts contemplated by section 
790.251. This statute extends constitutional rights—it does not in-
fringe upon them—and the case is unlikely to have any further rami-
fications in Second Amendment jurisprudence. 
 However, the case may lead courts to increase the scrutiny they 
apply when evaluating the constitutionality of statutes. Many courts 
and commentators presume that once the court applies the rational 
basis test, the statute will pass constitutional muster.80 However, 
this approach has been heavily criticized.81 While courts should re-
frain from second-guessing legislatures, there is no reason to uphold 
facially irrational or discriminatory statutes.82 Courts could follow 
Judge Hinkle’s approach by requiring statutes to meet something 
closer to the colloquial definition of rationality while still maintain-
ing substantial deference to the legislature. This may be part of an 
emerging trend. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court nominally ap-
plied rational basis review to strike down a Texas antisodomy statute.83
                                                                                                                    
 78. See, e.g., Bastible v. Weyerhaeuser, 437 F.3d 999, 1008 (10th Cir. 2006) (denying 
former employees’ claims for wrongful discharge after employer found firearms in em-
ployees’ vehicles). 
 79. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817 (emphasizing that the Second Amendment protects 
the individual right to bear arms for self-defense). 
 80. F.C.C. v. Beach Comms., Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993); Williams v. Pryor, 240 
F.3d 944, 947-48 (11th Cir. 2001). Indeed, between 1971 and 1996, there were only ten suc-
cessful rational basis equal protection claims before the Supreme Court. See Robert C. Far-
rell, Successful Rational Basis Claim in the Supreme Court from the 1971 Term Through 
Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 357 (1999). 
 81. See, e.g., Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced 
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1216-17 (1978) (arguing that because of 
tiered judicial scrutiny, “only a small part of the universe of plausible claims of unequal 
and unjust treatment by government is seriously considered by the federal courts; the vast 
majority of such claims are dismissed out of hand”). 
 82. The Court has, at different times, upheld laws which appear biased or silly. See, 
e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 726 (1963) (upholding a Kansas statute making en-
gaging in the business of debt adjustment a misdemeanor); Williamson v. Lee Optical of 
Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1955) (upholding an Oklahoma statute making it unlaw-
ful to use advertising media to solicit the sale of eyeglasses); Carolene Prods. Co. v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 18, 30-32 (1944) (upholding ban on shipping filled milk products because 
they might be confused with milk products). Indeed, a statute must generally be facially 
ridiculous to be invalidated under the rational basis test. See, e.g., DeWeese v. Town of 
Palm Beach, 812 F.2d 1365, 1365 (11th Cir. 1987) (invalidating ordinance prohibiting top-
less appearances in a case brought by a male runner). 
 83. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The Court did not explicitly articulate 
a standard of review for the case, but neither did the Court declare sexual orientation a 
suspect class nor find a fundamental right applicable in the case. See id. at 586 (Scalia, J. 
dissenting) (“[N]owhere does the Court’s opinion declare that homosexual sodomy is a ‘fun-
damental right’ under the Due Process Clause; nor does it subject the Texas law to the 
standard of review that would be appropriate (strict scrutiny) if homosexual sodomy were a 
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 However, it seems unlikely that Florida Retail Federation will be 
doctrinally important. The court’s decision appears motivated not by 
an increased level of rational basis scrutiny, but because even under 
the most lenient standard, it was difficult to determine which busi-
nesses would be covered by the statute. Judge Hinkle was not invali-
dating the legislature’s distinction between classes; rather, Judge 
Hinkle was holding that the legislature failed to adequately define 
the class in question. Though the court favorably cites commentary 
criticizing the rational basis test,84 it is unlikely that this case will 
implicate equal protection review in further cases. 
                                                                                                                    
‘fundamental right.’ . . . [T]he Court simply describes petitioners’ conduct as ‘an exercise of 
their liberty’—which it undoubtedly is—and proceeds to apply an unheard-of form of ra-
tional-basis review that will have far-reaching implications beyond this case.”). Similarly, 
the Court explicitly held that a Colorado referendum, which prohibited local governments 
from protecting sexual preference in antidiscrimination ordinances, unconstitutional under 
rational basis review. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996). 
 However, many commentators believe the Court is actually applying intermediate 
scrutiny or some form of scrutiny between rational basis and intermediate scrutiny. See, 
e.g., Michael P. Allen, The Underappreciated First Amendment Importance of Lawrence v. 
Texas, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1045, 1051 (2008) (noting that the Court’s analysis was 
neither traditional strict scrutiny nor rational basis); Neelum J. Wadhwani, Rational 
Views, Irrational Results, 84 TEX. L. REV. 801, 801 (2006) (“In Romer v. Evans, for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court stated that it was applying rational basis review to the Colorado 
anti-gay-rights amendment, yet the subsequent analysis did not resemble traditional ra-
tional basis review.” (citations omitted)); Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational 
Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened 
Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2794 
(2005) (stating that Lawrence “demonstrate[s] a more searching or meaningful form of ra-
tional basis review—or rational basis with bite in application if not in name—by directly 
addressing the legitimate interests proffered by the government and assessing whether 
those interests are rationally related to the classification in question”). While sexual orien-
tation is not a protected class, the Court appears unwilling to allow outright discrimination 
on such grounds.  
 84. See Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1288 (N.D. Fla. 2008) (citing Gerald 
Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a 
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972)). 
